

S E C R E T

SECRET

Auth: CG, 3d A. D.

Init:

Date: 5 Sept 1944

SECRET

Hq 3d Armd Div

960105

052000B Sept 1944

(Revised)

MAPS: Map, BELGIUM & FRANCE, Sheets 8, 9, 12, 13.

Scale - 1/100,000.

1. a. Current G-2 Periodic Reports.  
b. Omitted.
2. a. 3d Armd Div will attack on order to seize and secure the town of LIEGE (4729) and the crossings over the MEUSE RIVER.  
b. Troop Composition - No change from FO #13.
3. a. (1) 83d Armd Rcn Bn will precede the C Comds by two hours and will reconnoiter in C Comd zones.  
(2) When contact with enemy is made and heavy resistance is imminent, they will move to the N and S flank of the Div zone and screen the movement of the C Comds.  
b. C Comd "A" will advance rapidly in N zone, using as axes of advance, routes 1 and 2 shown on overlay. C Comd "A" will secure that portion of the town of LIEGE shown on overlay, and crossings over MEUSE RIVER.  
c. C Comd "B" will advance rapidly in S zone using as axes of advance routes 3 and 4. C Comd "B" will secure that portion of the town of LIEGE shown on overlay, and crossings over the MEUSE RIVER.  
d. Div Res (minus Hogan TF) will advance along route 2.  
e. Div Arty supports attack.  
x. (1) Situation reports regularly - reference phase lines and routes shown.  
(2) Units will keep closed up and will clear road and coil off roads at all halts.  
(3) Ln by Div units for march discipline.
4. No change.
5. a. No change.  
b. Axis of Sig Comm - Route 3.  
c. CP will follow combat elements along Route 3.

ROSE

Comdg

OFFICIAL:

SWEAT  
G-3

DIST:

VII Corps	(3)	Tn Comdr	(4)
1st Inf Div	(1)	486th AAA Fm	(1)
9th Inf Div	(1)	703d TD	(1)
C Comd A	(10)	83d Rcn Bn	(1)
C Comd B	(10)	CG	(1)
Div Res	(8)	Plus Staff	
Div Arty	(8)		

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMORED DIVISION  
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2  
APO 253, U. S. Army

SECRET

Auth: CG, 3d A.D.  
Init: *AB*  
Date: 9 Nov 44

ANNEX No. 1 to FO #16

9 November 1944.

INTELLIGENCE

Maps: Germany, GSGS 4414, Scale 1:25,000, Sheets 5004, 5005, 5103, 5104,  
5105, 5203, 5204, 5205;  
GSGS 4416, Scale 1:100,000, Sheets R/1, S/1.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION:

a. The 89th Inf Regt of the 12th Inf Div holds a sector from STOLBERG (incl) to GRESSENICH (excl). The regt'l CP is in the SW section of HASTENRATH, the 2d Bn is in STOLBERG, the 1st Bn is W of GRESSENICH. Holding a sector between the two bns of the Regt is the 12th Fus Bn. In support of the 12th Fus Bn, SW of HASTENRATH, heavier AT weapons (of the 12th AT Bn?) occupy positions which have larger fields of fire. This is a pattern of defense well known to us: A fus bn with close-in AT weapons, flanked by inf bns. The trains and rear echelon units of the div are on both sides of the main road ESCHWILLER-DUREN. On the western flank is the 27th Inf Regt (W of STOLBERG); on the eastern flank (including the road GRESSENICH-HASTENRATH) is the 48th Inf Regt (less the 2d Bn). Some armor has operated out of WERTH and in GRESSENICH but never with more than four tanks at any one time. (See Incl #1).

Immediate reserves are unknown, but the 6th Arm'd Army consisting of the 1, 2, 12 SS Pz Divs, and the 130th Pz LEHR Div is reported reforming in the BIELEFELD area. The 9th and 10th SS Pz Divs, last identified in Northern Holland, are capable of being pulled out of line for action on the XIX Corps front may, if forced, withdraw to the E across our div front. The 15th Pz Gren Div, last identified in Holland after a long march from the 3d Army sector, is also in reserve. As for the Army pz divs: 2d Pz Div is unlocated (but believed reforming in the NEUSS-COLOGNE area); 9th Pz Div was last reported in Holland and the 21st Pz Div on our 3d Army sector. The 116th Pz Div has been committed S of HURTGEN and in the vicinity of SCHMIDT. (See Incl #2).

As for parachute and inf formations, it is possible that a precht div (the 5th?) and two volks grenadier divs (the 567th and 569th?) can be mustered in the area. The 275th Inf Div is not likely to intervene in the battle for the Cologne bridge crossings.

For order of battle details see Incl #3.

b. Terrain and defenses:

(1) Purpose: The terrain and its artificial improvements for defense is considered from the point of view of armored exploitation in the Corps zone of action.

(2) General topography: The zone of probable employment of the Div is cut by two river valleys, the RUR and ERFT generally parallel to the RHINE. Except for occasional wooded areas the terrain in the sector north of a line through DUREN is rolling or flat open country suitable for employment of armor



S E C R E T

except when wet when the mud will be a serious obstacle to cross country movement. However, an adequate road net exists. South of DUREN a combination of urban development and wooded terrain constitutes an unsuitable field for maximum employment of tank capabilities. The broad flat valley of the ERFT is believed to be a barrier except for crossings on the existing road net. Wooded areas, road and bridge data including known bomb damage and prepared demolitions are shown on inclosed overlays (Incls #4 & #5).

(3) Prepared defenses: The following summary, of German improvement of the terrain is quoted from VII Corps G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 7 November 1944:

"(1) Originally the German defense plan was to continue the SIEGFRIED Line north from AACHEN. The breaching of this line at AACHEN called for a change of plans resulting in the preparation of a line along the ROER Valley. Priority seemed to be from North to South, but photographs of 28 and 29 October show the defenses to be continuous and reasonably formidable for several miles South of DUREN (F-1145). Depth and density of the positions vary considerably and consists of light field works. Small concrete pill boxes and anti-tank casemates appear occasionally. The possibility of concrete emplacement in or camouflaged as houses, haystacks, etc., must not be overlooked. Photography shows activity around buildings and haystacks. Critical towns such as DUREN (F-1145) and JULICH (F-0359) have perimeter defenses. As these towns are the focal point of roads and railroads and as they are usually situated in the natural advance corridors they become strongpoints of importance.

"(2) Another line of defenses extending Northward from ESCHWEILER (K-9647) joining the ROER River line at LINNICH, has been extensively developed. Here there is evidence of community digging and extensive anti-tank ditching. Although woods obscure much of the area South of ESCHWEILER there is evidence of these defenses continuing from the Western edge of the town in an arc Southeastwardly toward GRESSENICH (K-9942). \* \* \* \* \*

"(3) Late photography indicates the enemy intends to deny us the use of the autobahn. The autobahn bridge over the ROER has been reported as destroyed and many of the overpasses where it crosses other highways and railroads are being prepared for demolition.

"(4) Unquestionably woods and trees hide an appreciable portion of the enemy's defenses. (The overprinted defense maps, scale 1:25,000, show the details of this elaborate system and can be kept up to date by adding the new installations as they appear \* \* \* \*) As each defensive line or area reaches an effective state of preparation a new one is begun behind it. Scattered entrenching is now appearing along the ERFT River and Canal at KAPellen (F-2181), FRIMMERSDORF (F-1872), BLERICHEN (F-1865), ELSDORF (F-1760) and between MODRATH (F-2854) and TURNICH (F-3052). As on previous lines the priority of construction again seems to be from North to South."

c. Weather:

(1) Weather conditions during November are likely to continue generally unfavorable for armored operation due to probability of rain and poor visibility caused by low clouds, haze and drizzle. This condition may prevail two thirds of the days, normally improving in varying degrees by noon. Experience shows that 17 days of rain or 2.28 inches of precipitation may be expected. Snow can be expected on two days. Prevailing winds are from the west with an average of



S E C R E T

8-10 mph but periods of several days of calms may be expected.

d. Enemy capabilities:

(1) The enemy is capable of defending his present positions.

(2) The enemy is capable of counterattacking in our zone with a platoon or company of tanks and a bn of inf within six hrs after an attack and within 12 hrs in div strength including a bn of tanks.

Discussion: It is possible that the enemy will defend his present positions and delay to the RUR River. Considerable digging along the RUR River leads to the belief that it is the main line of defense before COLOGNE.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION:

a. What is the location of mine fields and AT weapons in the HASTENRATH (K-9744)-WERTH (K-9743)-KOTTENICH (K09943) area?

b. Will the enemy counterattack west of the RUR? When, where and in what strength?

c. What is the condition of bridges over the RUR and ERFT Rivers?

d. Will the line of the ERFT River be defended? If so, with what troops?

e. Will armored reserves east of the RHINE be employed west of the RHINE? When and in what strength?

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION:

a. Aviation: Results of Tactical Reconnaissance will be disseminated. Missions of an urgent nature will be requested through G-2.

b. Ground Reconnaissance: Initial reconnaissance will be made by combat elements.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS: S.O.P.

5. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS: As issued. Additional cover of 1:25,000 defense overprints and air photographs will be made available when received from higher headquarters. Requests for special air photography will be made through G-2.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

a. Special attention will be given to radio and telephone security and to the safeguarding of documents connected with the operations of FO #16.

b. All personnel will be alert to detect enemy agents known to be operating behind First Army lines or who may be left behind our lines as our troops advance.

c. Attention is directed to letter this headquarters 15 September 1944, subject: Security During Operations in Germany.

d. Detachments of the CIC with C Comd A, C Comd B and Div Hq.



S E C R E T

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION: S.O.P.

ROSE  
Cond

Official:

*13 Jan*  
G-2

DISTRIBUTION: Same as FO #16.

- 5 Incls: #1 - Order of Battle Overlay, Corps Sector - 1:25,000.  
#2 - Order of Battle Overlay, Army Sector - 1:25,000.  
#3 - Order of Battle Notes. /00  
#4 - Terrain Overlay to the RUR - 1:25,000.  
#5 - Terrain Overlay RUR & RHINE - 1:100,000.



Incl #3  
O/B Supl to Int Annex of FO #16

The following is a synthesis of available information on all divisions which are now reported in contact on VII Corps front or which it is believed may be encountered during this operation.

## 2 PANZER DIVISION

CG--Genlt von Luttwitz (last reported July 3), or Col Brassert.

History: One of the stronger divisions in France at the time of the invasion, it was committed very early in the Caen-Caumont sector. It took part in the retreat toward Germany after the battle at Falaise. No report has been received of its destruction during that campaign although its losses were undoubtedly extremely severe. A Battle Group Suchert (formed from elements of 304 Pz Gren Regt) is the only element of the div reliably reported since we reached the borders of Germany. PAs report the div is now reforming somewhere in Germany--probably in the Cologne area.

### Composition:

2 Pz Recon Bn--CO, Maj Schkopp or Riedel. Normally 5 cos.

3 Pz Art--CO, Lt Col Koch.

I Bn--CO, Capt Wiedenbruck

1 Co--CO, Capt von Lasden

4 Co--CO, Capt Ranzing. FPM 4/59179.

II Bn--Nothing recently reported.

2 Pz Gren Regt--CO, Lt Col Brassert (?). Adj., Oblt Gortke.

Hq Co CO, Lt Vemela.

I Bn--CO, Capt Brandts. FPM 08595.

2 Co--CO, Lt Reinhardt.

3 Co--CO, Oblt Kleinert.

II Bn--CO, Capt Wandschau. Adj., Lt Peitner.

5 Co--CO, Lt Geyer. FPM 21745.

6 Co--CO, Lt Knoth. FPM 14420.

7 Co--CO, Lt Flockenstein. FPM 16309.

8 Co--CO, Lt Sauer. FPM 00615.

9 Inf How Co

10 Engr Co

304 Pz Gren Regt--CO, Lt Col Schacke.

Elements of this regt have been sacrificed in the Mechen struggle. Part of this regt has been identified in Battle Group Suchert.

I Bn--(Arndt) CO, Maj Tanzler.

1 Co--CO, Oblt Scholing. FPM 08178.

3 Co--CO, Oblt Stockmeyer.

II Bn--CO, Capt Walhubner.

5 Co--CO, Lt Wendland.

6 Co--CO, Capt Lange.

7 Co--CO, Capt Bott.

9 Inf How Co

10 Engr Co

74 Arty Regt--3 arty bns. CO, Col Dous or Maj Hausl.

36 Pz Engr Bn--CO, Maj Koleniac (?). Army reported Nov 5 that a

Marsch Co of 150 men was distributed to 3 cos of bn.

38 Pz Sig Bn

36 AT Bn--CO, Maj Storz.



3 PZ GREN DIV

CG--Gen Cuno (Replaced Gen Hocker?)

History: One of the divisions destroyed at Stalingrad, it was reformed in France and sent to the Italian front June 1943 where it was active intermittently until it was transferred to the Western front in August 44. It saw severe action on the Belfort front until the middle of October when it was sent North to help at Aachen. It launched several small counterattacks in an effort to stall off the final taking of Aachen.

Composition:103 Pz Gren Bn--CO, Capt Feldhof.

103 Pz Bn--No tanks were identified with the div while it was in the Belfort area and air observed no tanks during the move N, but some 60 tanks were reported used during the counterattacks at Aachen and a PW gave the following information: Originally the bn had 3 assault gun cos of 18 long-barreled SP 75mm guns each and 1 A/Tk Co. PW further reported there were only 7 guns in his sector Oct 23 and that 902 Assault Gun Brigade (last reported at about co strength) was supporting the div. It is probable that on reaching this sector and during the lull after the Aachen battles, the div managed to get tank or assault gun replacements.

8 Pz Gren Regt--Entered present area with an estimated strength of 80 men per co. PW report Oct 20 that 3-400 men were withdrawn from the regt for further training in Germany and that the regt was disbanded. It has not been identified for some time on the line. However, there is always the possibility that it has been reorganized during the lull after Aachen.

29 Pz Gren Regt--CO, Maj Wogenor.

8 Co--1 mortar pltn with 6 8cm mortars; 1 MG pltn with 4 MG; 1 AT pltn with 2 75mm AT guns; 120 men. (Reported Oct 26).

9, 10, 11 Cos--Total 220 men reported Oct 17.

3 Arty Regt--I Bn--Reported with 3 bttries ea of 4 105mm hows ea.

II Bn--Same as I Bn.

III Bn--2 bttries of 4 150mm hows ea

1 btry of 4 105mm guns.

There was a report that III Bn remained in Italy.

Even if so, replacements were probably received since the move North.

3 Engr Bn3 A/Tk Bn3 Sig Bn12 INFANTRY DIVISION

CG--Genlt v. Lutzow (previous to coming to the West).

Recently reported to be Col Engel or Col Schiele.

History: The div was identified on our front Sept 16. It was sent from E Prussia where it had been reconstituted and newly equipped following a severe defeat on the Russian front. It was sent to our front to prevent the expansion of our break through the Siegfried Line and to protect Duren.



It counterattacked for several days on both our flanks, after which regts were reported to have received replacements for their quite heavy losses (probably from the agglomeration of loose Res, Fortress, etc. bns in the area). It was at first reported at full strength--12,000-14,000-- when it entered this area. Later documentary evidence gave the strength of 246 Inf Div at approx. 8000 and it is not believed that the 12 Inf Div is much stronger than that. The lull on its front and the importance attached to that front by the German high command make it probable that the div has again been brought to its original strength.

Composition:

12 Fus (Res) Bn--CO, Maj Lisch.

3 lt troops--approx 70 men each reported.

1 hvy troop--Reported with 81Gs, 81mm mortars, and 120mm mortars.

1 Engr Pltn

1 AT Pltn--81mm Rocket guns ("Puppehon"). Gun is similar to our bazooka, but is mounted on two wheels.

81mm Rocket projector (Ofenrohr). Similar to our bazooka.

89 Inf Regt--2 bns

1st Co

5th Co--80 men reported.

6th Co--80 men reported.

7th Co--80 men reported.

Hvy Cos--6 81G, 3 81mm mortars, 3 120mm mortars.

13 Co

14 Co--1 pltn of 10-12 bazookas, 1 pltn of either inf hows or anti-tank guns.

48 Inf Regt--Maj Osterholt reported in regt.

1, 2, 3 Cos.

5 Co--Reported with 110 men.

Hvy Cos--Probably the same as 89 Inf Regt.

II Bn--Identified on the XIX Corps front but probably returned to area since then.

13 Co--CO, Oblt Fiker. 111 men reported Oct 22.

14 Co--80 men, 3 75mm AT guns, bazookas.

27 Inf Regt--CO, Maj Lemp or Leum.

I, III Bns identified. PW reports only these bns exist.

5 Co--Contains half-tracks and flame throwers.

9 Co--CO, Capt Janke.

10 Co--PW reported no officers were left after first attacks.

11 Co--Reported with 100 men.

Hvy and regtl Cos--probably the same as 89 Inf Regt.

Assault Pltn--III Bn has a special pltn called "Assault Pltn"--30 men with machine pistols.

Arty Regt (12?)--CO, Maj Boehm. Reported with 3 lt bns of 12 105mm gun/howers ea and 1 med bn of 9 150mm hows. 12 Btry CO, Lt neugebauer.

12 Engr Bn--Used as infantry.

2 Co--Reported with 120 men. (Has suffered some losses.)



S-E-C-R-E-T

12 Anti-Tank Bn--1 Co--12 75mm AT guns (Mtz).

2 guns were reported destroyed.

2 Co--12 75mm Assault Guns.

3 Co--20mm AA/AT guns.

1012 Assault Gun Co--Reported with 8 assault guns, 150 men (Oct 14).

15 PZ GREN DIV

CG--Genlt Eberhardt Rodt.

History: This division was actively engaged in both the Sicilian and Italian campaigns before being transferred to the Western Front in late August with the 3 Pz <sup>G</sup>r Div in an effort to halt the US ~~Third Army~~ drive toward Germany. Toward the end of Oct, it moved north and was identified on the British sector. More recently it has left the line and is presumably in reserve in the Cologne area. VII Corps estimated 7000 men in the division Oct 26.

Composition:

115 Pz Ren Bn

115 Pz Bn--Reported that bn received elements of 113 Pz Brigade before moving north. Another report stated that 30 Mk V tanks were received on the way north. The Bn may have as many as 60 tanks and/or assault guns.

104 Pz Gren Regt--Believed with 3 bns.

115 Pz Gren Regt--Not believed with the div.

129 Pz Gren Regt--Believed to have 3 bns.

33 Arty Regt

33 AT Bn

33 Engr Bn

78 Sig Bn

9 PANZER DIVISION

CG--Gen Jolassi or Genlt Walter Scheller.

History: Formed in France from remnants of 9 Pz Div and 273 Pz Tng Div. Our first encounter with elements of this div was in the drive from Mayenne to Rancos. It was badly cut during the retreat to Germany. It was encountered again soon after our initial assault on the Siegfried Line. At that time, the div controlled a number of ersatz and miscellaneous bns. Since then, its use in a counter-attacking role in the Arnheim sector and absorption of other units indicate it has managed by reorganization to return to a more effective strength. This div is also out of contact and may be expected to be in tactical reserve and capable of commitment on the First US Army front.

Composition:

9 Pz Ren Bn--CO, Maj Buckoff (last Reported in August).

10 Pz Gren Regt--Army reports documentary evidence of 3 bns (Nov 3).

11 Pz Gren Regt--May also have 3 bns.

33 Pz Regt--Believed to have absorbed some elements of 105 Pz Bde. May have received other reinforcements.

50 Pz AT Bn--504 AT Bn with 88mm guns was reported associated with div and may have been absorbed.

102 Pz Arty Regt--Div controlled 460 Hvy Arty Bn, 59 Hvy Arty Ersatz Bn during September. They have probably been absorbed into the arty regt.



S-E-C-R-E-T

86 Pz Engr Bn  
81 Pz Sig Bn  
287 (GHQ) AA Bn--Attached in France.

116 PANZER DIVISION

CG--Reported alternately as Col Waldenberg and Genlt Gerhardt Graf von Schwerin. Von Schwerin is considered one of the ablest of the German generals. He is extremely popular with his men. The div adjutant is identified as Maj Guderian, son of Field Marshall Heinz Guderian, tank expert, and now C/S of the German Army.

History: The div was formed by the amalgamation of 179 Pz Tng Div and 16 Pz Gren Div remnants in France. Committed on the Normandy front, it lost heavily on the British sector, in a counterattack at Mortain, and in making its escape from the Falaise pocket. It was active in the defense of Aachen and later withdrawn to the Juelich area for a reported refitting. It has been identified recently as the counterattacking force attempting to halt the advance of the 38 US Inf Div. The div has received replacements from 108 Pz Gr Repl Bn, 6 Pz Arty Bn, 60 Pz Gr Repl Bn, 13 GAF Fortress Bn. PWs taken from the div have an average 3-5 years military experience.

Composition:

116 Pz Ren Bn--1 Co--50-60 men, 12 Armd Cars (Reported Oct 17).

2 Co--Probably same as 1 Co.

3 Co--80 men reported Oct 17.

Bn probably contains a pltn of AT guns and a pltn of Inf Hows or 120mm mortars. The desired organization consists of 5 cos.

116 Pz Regt--Estimates of tank strength vary from 25 to a reported 150. It is probable the regt has in the vic of 60 tanks. The latest estimate from 28 US Inf Div (now in contact) is 25 Mk V tanks. Mk IVs and Mk VIs have also been reported. It seems possible that the regt contains a mixed bn of 60 tanks and a bn of assault guns. The regt never had more than 2 bns.

60 Pz Gren Regt--CO, Maj Zander.

I Bn--CO, Capt Nagel

Carried in half-tracks.

1, 2, 3 Cos--Reported Nov 4 with approx 50 men ea. Organized into 2 pltns of 4 sq ds (7 men) ea. 1 LMG per sqd.

4 Hvy Co--4 50mm mortars, 6 HMG.

AA Pltn--One reported with ca bn of div.

II Bn--CO, Capt Schneider or Maj Kastensen

Rifle cos are reported with 3 automatic rifles, 2 bazookas (replacing AT sec in Co). Each sqd is reported with 2 Pz Fausts.

Bn is transported in trucks.

5 Co--CO, Lt Helman.

8 Co--4 HMGs, 4 81mm mortars, 4 75mm AT guns.

Regtl Cos--May have 9 Inf How and 10 Engr Cos.



156 Pz Gren Regt--CO, Col Fischer.

I Bn--CO, Capt Winter.

Bn reported with armed carriers.

Rifle Cos--3 pltns of 3 sqds ea. 1 LMG in ea sqd. 1 hvy pltn of 2 HMGs and possibly some mortars.

Hvy Co--Provided the hvy pltns for the rifle cos. Mortars may be concentrated in this co for effective firepower.

2 Co--CO, Lt Mueller.

3 Co--CO, Lt Backstedt.

II Bn--Rifle cos probably similar to I Bn.

8 Hvy Co--Reported Oct 24 with HMG, 8cm mortars, 3 75mm AT guns, 3-4 20mm AA/AT.

Regtl Cos--May have 9 Inf How and 10 Engr Cos.

146 Arty Regt--CO, Kall (August 44).

I Bn--CO, Maj Sandkuhl (August).

Possibly 3 arty bns (24 105mm gun/how, 8 150mm hows, 4 105mm guns).

675 Pz Engr Bn--CO, Capt Appel.

Estimated 100 men Oct 17. (prob received repl since)

228 Pz AT Bn

228 Pz Sig Bn

60 or 146 Feld Ers Bn--Last reported with 280 men. Not heavily engaged.

AA Bn (GHQ)--Reported with div. Will probably have several 88mm AA/AT guns.

## 176 INFANTRY DIV

History: This actually a group of miscellaneous units hastily thrown together under the control of 176 Div Staff, in an effort to stave off final disaster as we approached the Siegfried Line. There has been some evidence that attempts were made to reorganize the miscellaneous units and remnants into divisional units in an effort to improve the efficiency of the div. It is extremely difficult to assess the strength of such a unit but it may have as many as 2500-3000 men. It has been in contact almost continuously since the middle of Sept.

Compositions: The following units are reported under its control:

22 GAF Regt  
159 Repl Bn  
167 Marsch Bn  
328 Repl Bn  
464 Repl Bn  
2 86 (Ear trouble) Repl Bn  
15 Ren Bn (Renumbered 176?)  
306 West Bn  
25 Homeguard Bn  
176 Arty Regt  
842 Mtz GHQ Arty Bn  
843 Mtz GHQ Arty Bn  
423 Arty Bn  
15 GAF Fortress Bn (4 Cos).



183 INFANTRY DIV

CG--Gen Lango

History: The div is a hurriedly reconstituted unit that had been destroyed on the Russian front. It is reported to be a renumbered Volksgrenadier Div 564. Personnel includes convalescents, factory worker, RR employees, Air Force personnel, and even party members. It has been in continuous contact on XIX Corps front since coming to the West. It entered the line with a reported company strength of 130 men. Approx 1100 PW taken from div by Oct 10.

Composition:219 Fus (Ren) Bn330 Inf Regt--3 bns of 4 Cos ea reported.

III Bn--CO, Capt Koehler. 42 MG Bn and NCO Bn Duren reported incorporated Oct 23.

343 Inf Regt--3 bns of 4 cos ea reported. CO, Maj Hoffmann.

II Bn --CO, Capt Goisinger.

NCO Bn Juelich incorporated. (Reported Oct 23)

351 Inf Regt--3 bns of 4 cos ea reported.219 Arty Regt--CO, Col Mayer.

I Bn--3 btries ea of 6 75mm AT guns (mtz).

II Bn--CO, Capt Besserer.

2 btries ea of 6 105mm hows (mtz).

III Bn--3 btries ea of 6 105mm hows (mtz).

IV Bn--2 btries ea of 6 150mm hows (horse-drawn).

Anti-Tank Co--Reported Sept 27 with 9 75mm A/T guns.Engr Co--Reported Sept 27 with 100 men. Explosives and mines.PARACHUTE DIVISIONS

It has been fairly well established that the Parachute Divisions have been the most effective of the German formations. It is only natural that every effort would be made to reconstitute those divs which have suffered losses and to use those available at the most critical points in the line. Since a good percentage of replacements for the ground forces are coming from the German Air Force, it is also probable that good personnel for the reorganization of these Parachute Divisions is available. 2 Para and 5 Para Divs have been reliably reported forming in the Cologne area.

2 PARA DIV

CG--Genlt Hermann Bernhard Ramcke.

History: Elements of the division were reported in the Brest Peninsula during the campaign in Normandy. Few reports have been received since. It is probable that the div was not reformed in Brittany but that those elements were withdrawn and are now reported reforming in the Cologne area.

Composition:

2, 6 (?), 7 Para Inf Regts

2 Para Arty Regt--Probably a good number of 88mm guns included.

2 Para Flak Bn

2 Para AT Bn--Probably includes 88mm guns.

2 Para Engr Bn

2 Para Sig Bn



5 PARA DIV

CG--Genlt Wilke

History: The 5 Para Div was used to hold the German line together at the time of the breakthrough in Normandy. It fought almost continuously in the Falaise pocket and during the retreat from France. After some light contact since, it has been reported several times and from widely different sources to be reforming in the Cologne area. If fully reconstituted, it should be a formidable division.

Composition:

5 Para Recon Bn

13 Para Rifle Regt--CO, Capt Mosheimer.

14 Para Rifle Regt--CO, Reicke or Maj Nosten.

15 Para Rifle Regt--CO, Lt Col Greschke.

5 Para Arty Regt--Probably will include a number of 88mm guns.

6 (5?)--6 Para Repl Tng Bn has been reported forming about 1 Para AT Bn per month. It may be that the number 6 will be changed to 5 on attachment to 5 Para Div.

1 Co--4 88mm AT guns.

2 Co--4 75mm AT guns SP.

3 Co--4 75mm Assault guns or towed AT guns.

All three companies may have additional pltns of bazookas.

5 Para Engr Bn

5 Para Sig Bn

7 PARA DIV (Believed to be the same as Para Div Erdmann.)

20 Para Regt--II, III Bns reported.

21 Para Regt--II, III Bns reported.

Divisional units are probably numbered 7.PARA DIV ERDMANN (Believed to be the 7 Para Div.)

Para Regt Menzel--Composed of Para Officer Candidates. Only I Bn has been reported (Oct 14).

I Bn--4 Cos of 120 men ea.

SS DIVISIONS

The SS divs (1, 2, 9, 10, 12, 17) are in the process of reorganization. 9 and 10SS Pz Divs are possibly in Holland. The others are probably close to the Rhine. The desired organization for these divisions gives them about 3000 inf, 2000 men in the Engr, AT, and Sig units. To this there will be added 2 lt and possibly a 3rd medium arty bn, a GHQ AA Bn probably drawn from the flak in the Ruhr area, and finally the tank regt. This consists of a bn of 60 Panthers and possibly a bn of 42 assault guns.

The Sixth Armored Army under Sepp Dietrich consisting of 1, 2, 12SS, and Pz Lehr Divs is reported in the Bielefeld area.



1SS PANZER DIV ADOLPH HITLER

CG--SS Gruppenfuhrer Theodor Wisch (Lt Gen)

SS Brigadefuhrer Mohrke (Maj Gen)

1SS Pz Regt--CO, Oberstarrenbaumfuhrer (Lt Col) Peiper.

Tank Bn--CO, Starnbaumfuhrer (Maj) Kling.

Assault Gun Bn--CO, Hauptsturnfuhrer (Capt) Rettlinger.

1 SS Pz Gren Regt--CSBF Rosenkohl,

2SS Pz Gren Regt--OSBF Frey.

1SS Pz Arty Regt

1SS Pz Ren Bn

1SS Pz Engr Bn

1SS Pz AA/AT Bn (?)

2SS PANZER DIV DAS REICH

CG--Standartenfuhrer (Col) Otto Baum

Oberfuhrer (Brig Gen) Lammerding.

2SS Tank Regt--Needs complete reequipment.

3 SS Pz Gren Regt Deutschland--OSBF Witzleben.

4 SS Pz Gren Regt Der Fuehrer--SBF Weidinger.

2 SS Pz Arty Regt

2 SS AA Bn

2 SS Pz Ren Bn--HSF Resch.

2 SS Pz Engr Bn--HSF Brozau.

2 SS AT Bn--SBF (Maj) Knoep.

12SS PANZER DIV HITLER JUGEND

CO--Standartenfuhrer Meyer.

12SS Pz Regt--SF Wuensche.

25SS Pz Gren Regt--OSBF Milius.

26SS Pz Gr Regt--OSBF Mohrke

12SS Pz Arty Regt--OSBF Schroder.

12SS Pz Ren Bn--Oldenbrueck.

12SS Pz Engr Bn--SBF Muller.

12SS AA Bn--SBF Lend.

12SS A/T Bn

12SS Pz Sig Bn--SBF Pandol.

130 PZ LEHR DIV

CG--Genlt Fritz Bayerlein.

G-1--Maj Wrode.

G-3--Maj Kaufmann.

G-2--Colt Fischer.

G-4--Maj Werncke.

130 Pz Ren Bn--Maj Fallois.

130 Pz Regt--Col Bornhut or Col Gerhard.

901 Pz Gren Regt--Lt Col Scholze or Col von Hauser.

902 Pz Gren Regt--Col Gutmann or Col Welscher.

130 Pz Arty Regt--Col Luxembourg.

130 Pz Engr Bn--Maj Brandt.

103 Pz Sig Bn--Capt Hauck.

130 Pz AT Bn--Maj Barth.



S-E-C-R-E-T

In addition to the 4 armored divisions in the 6th Armored Army, two divisions, 9SS Pz Div (which the Germans have had great difficulty in extricating from the line) and 17SS Pz Gren Div, which from recent reports has achieved a certain amount of reorganization and now is committed on the line S of Metz, might be used.

9SS PZ DIV HOHENSTAUFFEN

CG--OF Sylvester Stadler

9SS Pz Regt--OSBF Meyer.  
19SS Pz Gren Regt--Maj Voight.  
20 SS Pz Gren Regt--SBF Zollhofer.  
9SS Pz Arty Regt--  
9SS Pz Engr Bn  
9SS Pz AT Bn  
9SS Pz Rcn Bn  
9SS Pz AA Bn  
9SS Pz Sig Bn

17SS PZ GREN DIV GOETZ v. BERLICHINGEN

CG--Last reported Maj Gen Baum.

Although this division was almost completely destroyed in the battle for France, every effort has been made to maintain it as a unit. It appears that there is a definite policy that SS Divs will not be disbanded. Because of the long retreat from France, the div could not be reconstituted until recently when, according to documents, it absorbed the following units: 49SS Pz Gren Brigade, 51SS Pz Gren Brigade, Einheit Rechenberg (Bn size), 1 Co of the 285 AT Bn. Unless it loses heavily in its present sector, it can be considered a strong division.

OTHER UNITS

Finally 2 inf divs of very poor caliber are being formed of about 5000 men each on the E bank of the Rhine between Clogno and Bonn. Possibly these are 567 Volksgrenadier Div (Regtl Nos 1159, 1160, 1161) and the 569 Volksgrenadier Div (Regtl Nos 1165, 1166, 1167).

The 503, 504, 506 Mobile Bns under the Regt Fritschen are being reorganized on the XIX Corps front. Thus, the regt is capable of intervention on our sector. It has been estimated that each bn has 400 men and 21 guns.

341 Aslt Gun Bde--PW--1 Btry has 9 105mm hows SP. 2 Btry has 75mm guns SP.

3 Btry has 9 105mm hows SP. (only 5 are working.)

394 Aslt Gun Bde--Reported Oct 20 with 3 btries, ea with 4 75mm guns on Mk III III chassis and 6 105mm hows SP. 3 Btry lost 4 pieces Oct 17.

506 Hvy Tank Bn--PW reported Oct 14 3 cos with 14 Tigers ea. XIX Corps estimated 20-30 Tigers in Bn Oct 17.

766 Arty Bde--PW--Newly equipped. Reported Oct 18 with I Bn of 3 btries of 6 75mm guns ea, II and III Bns with 105mm hows.

902 Aslt Gun Bde--PW reports Oct 16--3 btries ea with 5 75mm SP gun on Mk III chassis. 2 Btry destroyed.



HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMORED DIVISION  
Office of the Commanding General


A.P.O. #253,  
U. S. Army,  
14 December 1944.

TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE THIRD ARMORED (SPEARHEAD) DIVISION:

The members of my staff and I extend to each individual of this Division and to their loved ones at home, our sincere good wishes for a Merry Christmas and a very Happy New Year.

The successful operation of this Division from the beaches of Normandy to the banks of the Rhine in Germany has been made possible only by your devotion to duty, self sacrifice, and adherence to the high ideals and standards that we have set for ourselves.

Please transmit to your loved ones at home my personal good wishes for the coming holidays, and my sincere hope that next Christmas will find all of us reunited with those we left at home, when the achievements of the Spearhead Division will be the subject of proud conversation rather than a basis for future planning. It will then be with a feeling of satisfaction that we will know that we have done our part to restore "peace on earth and good will to men."



MAURICE ROSE,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.



— SECRET —

ROUGH DRAFT

CRACKING THE SIEGFRIED LINE  
TASK FORCE DOAN, COMBAT COMMAND "A"  
THIRD ARMORED DIVISION

13 - 19 September 1944.

(Based in interviews with Col. L. L. Doan, CO TF "X", and Lt Col. William R. Orr, CO 1st Bn, 36th Armored Infantry Regiment).

The location selected for penetration of the Siegfried Line by the 3rd Armored Division's Combat Command "A", Task Force "X", under Lt. Col. Leander L. Doan, on 13 September 1944, was about 1 kilometer across the EUPEN-GERMAN Border, and approximately 5 kilometers south to southeast of the city of AACHEN. The EUPEN-GERMAN boundary in this area follows a general northwest to southeast direction. The location of the action of 13 September is about 1 kilometer south of the village of OBER FORSTBACH, and just to the right (East) of the road which comes up from EUPEN through EYNATTEN (the last village before crossing the Border), and runs on northeast into Germany proper, through OBER FORSTBACH, KORNELIMUNSTER, EUSEBACH and STOLBERG in that order, these latter German towns forming a crescent and becoming something of a defense perimeter approximately 5 kilometers southeast of AACHEN.

In the OBER FORSTBACH vicinity the outer-defenses of the Siegfried Line run in a northwest to southeast direction, 1,000 yards more or less behind the border. The defenses are faced all along the Line with dragons' teeth, with large pillboxes every 100 yards or so to the rear on favorable terrain, and further supported by some hasty trenching and numerous large caliber guns and mortars in depth, and back into the town of OBER FORSTBACH. These defenses were placed in fairly open, moderately rolling, cow-pasture terrain. There are mixed fields of fire, but the somewhat higher ground in OBER FORSTBACH and on the folding ground to the southeast provide many favorable gun and pillbox emplacements, covering the dragons' teeth and other outer defenses of the Line. Across such possible north-south lines of fire, however, runs a gentle West-East ridge, and just south of that a West-East draw, both just inside the German side of the dragons' teeth and immediately covered by pillboxes, but offering some cover or at least concealment from more distant fire from the North, and a flanking approach to the right or East; that is, for a force approaching from the South. These factors of terrain are included because they were to effect vitally the action of 13th September.

During the evening and night of 12-13 September, Task Force "X" assembled in the concealment of the AACHEN-EYNATTEN WALD, which is just southwest of OBER FORSTBACH and the Siegfried Line. The forest comes to a point and ends only about 200 to 300 yards south of the dragon's teeth (K868359). From the vicinity of his CP to the South, near LANGFELD, Col. Doan, on the evening of 12 September, could look northeast and see the dragons' teeth. Several German civilians and a Rumanian, who had been in the German Army, said they had not seen any German forces out in front of the Americans.

During the night, however, 3 patrols were sent out to reconnoiter the dragons' teeth and beyond. One patrol, to the right, went through the dragons' teeth and beyond. The second, to the right, went through the

- 1 -  
- SECRET -



dragons' teeth and beyond. One patrol, to the right, went through the dragons' teeth, penetrating 600 yards they said (which the Colonel doubted) and found the area untankable, but encountered no enemy. The second patrol, in the center, went toward the dragons' teeth and found a "large group" of Germans on the South side of the obstacles. The third patrol, on the left, worked through the woods and reconnoitered the dragons' teeth, stating that they had not seen the enemy, but that they thought a breach could be made in the dragons' teeth in that direction, reporting no antitank ditches found. On the whole, the patrols gave very incomplete and unsatisfactory information.

The plan of attack formulated by Col. Doan at 0430 on the morning of 13 September was as follows:

1. Task Force "X" would move through the woods on the left of the CP to reach the line of departure at the edge of the woods (K869359 to 871356). The tanks were to stay at the line of departure, supporting the fire of the Battalion of the 36th Armored Infantry. The Infantry was to go through the dragons' teeth and secure the high ground beyond.

2. Next, the Engineers of the 23rd were to come up and make a breach in the dragons' teeth, and the tanks would follow after.

3. The time of attack would be to move out at 0700, and attack at 0900.

After daylight in the morning, Col. Doan heard that the Infantry was on the line of departure ahead of time, but that the tanks had missed directions and were going South in the woods. This, however, was corrected and it seemed that they would be able to move off very close to schedule. With General Hickey, Col. Doan went up to the Infantry, now dismounted, and saw that things were getting straightened out and ready to move off.

The exact point of penetration of the dragons' teeth and pillboxes (indicated by an arrow on the overlay) was selected because it was in defilade from the pillboxes, except the one immediately to the front (marked PB #1 on the overlay). There was no sign of activity from this or the other pillboxes at the time. While waiting for the tanks to come up, around 1000, the Infantry moved out of the woods, and went about 200 yards to the dirt road which crossed their front, coming to the house and put about 50 rounds of 75 and 76-mm into pillbox #1, which was about 150 yards away, across the dragons' teeth. No signs of life were seen from the pillbox, and up to this time, about 1100, the men had received no return fire. A CP was now set up at the house, with Col. Doan, Capt. Plummer, then commanding the Armored Infantry Battalion, and Capt. Replogle, commanding the Engineers unit.

As the Infantry proceeded to the right of the house, through the dragons' teeth and up the rising ground beyond, they drew the first enemy fire - from the right - about 1230. About 200 yards beyond the dragons' teeth, as they advanced over the crest of the rise, they were suddenly swept by machine-gun fire from pillbox #2 (K875373) on the right front; and were forced to withdraw, going back to the dragons' teeth for protection and taking cover behind them.

Col. Doan then ordered the Infantry to move to the left along the dragons' teeth to attack from the West and approach pillbox #2. This maneuver was carried out, the Infantry reaching a North-South line between Pillboxes #1 and 3 (marked on overlay), where it deployed, but coming under heavy machine-gun fire. For the first time, fire was thought to be coming from Pillbox #1, in the immediate vicinity of which 2 men were badly wounded. One of our aid men, who spoke German, went up to get the two



wounded men; and while there called out to the Germans in the pillbox to come out and give themselves up. There were 12 of them inside. In the equivalent German, their spokesman said: "Go to hell. We will fight it out".

For the next two hours the situation did not improve. For a third time, our Infantry tried to push on through the dragons' teeth, but without success. Ten tanks came up from the road and deployed along the dragons' teeth to support the Infantry; and the Engineers moved up to lay wire and demolitions to blast the teeth. At about 1400, heavy enemy mortar fire began falling, rendering the situation more difficult.

At 1500, Col. Doan was directed to return from his GP in the house indicated, to confer with General Hickey. General Rose, the 3rd Armored Commander, was also there - near the line of departure. Col. Doan had just heard from an unidentified lieutenant that there was an improvised roadway over the dragons' teeth, about 300 yards to the right of the intended point of penetration. The roadway had been made by filling in stone and earth between the teeth, and had been built apparently by local farmers for their convenience. Another officer, in the woods near General Hickey, confirmed the existence of the passage over the dragons' teeth, and it was decided to try it.

Since it was reported that the passage over the dragons' teeth was mined, the platoon of 4 tanks sent by Col. Doan to investigate was headed by a flail tank. The passage was found unmined, but as the flail tank mounted the improvised roadway, the loose earth gave and the tank lurched over to the left, threatening to go over into the dragons' teeth and block the passage. Regardless of the heavy mortar fire, Lt. John R. Hoffman, CO of "E" Company, of tanks, dismounted, hitched his tank to the flail tank and tried to pull it out. When that failed, still another tank was hitched on, and the two of them succeeded in pulling out the stalled flail. "Then", said Col. Doan, "they squared off and sailed through. The dragons' teeth had been breached.

Immediately, all the tanks of TF"X" were ordered through the gap; and by 1550 all 20 went through, except that of Col. Doan, who followed shortly after. The tanks began to cruise the pillbox area and the draws south of VERSCHIED, and in a few minutes had knocked out 6 of them, and also several 88s, some of which were unmanned. At 1600, TF"Y" was ordered to coil behind TF"X".

Before rejoining his tanks, Col. Doan learned that Capt Plummer had reported 60 casualties in his battalion of Infantry, and shortly thereafter the captain himself was badly wounded. This indicated the continued stiff opposition, which was being met to the North. Lt. Col. William R. Orr was placed in command of the Infantry Battalion of the 36th, and ordered them to turn East toward the village of NUTHEIM, about 2 kilometers away, the approach to which was covered by a long West-to-East draw. Col. Doan's tanks were to work that way also.

Shortly after 1600, as Col Doan mounted his tank to join the rest of the force on the other side of the dragons' teeth, the Germans began pouring in a murderous artillery fire. As the tanks cleaned out the nearest pillboxes and advanced over the crest northward, they ran into new and heavier fire from the North and Northwest. Other pillboxes, 88s and possibly heavier guns in that direction, to the south of OBER FORSTBACH and in the town, were coming into play with telling effect. Several of our tanks were knocked out in a short space of time. Col. Silford, the Tank Battalion CO, was killed and Col. Doan saw his tank burning.



The tanks by this time were so dispersed and communications so disrupted by the enemy fire that Col Doan had great difficulty in contacting them. He wanted to get them down the draw to the right (East) toward NUTHEIM, where they could set up a defense area with the infantry, already ordered to that vicinity. At first, he could see only 4 or 5 of his tanks still in the fight. Some of them had veered over to the left (West) toward the southern outskirts of OBER FORSTBACH with the idea of getting protection from the houses along the road leading into the town. With the Tank Battalion CO, Col. S. T. Tilford, killed, the "F" Company CO, Capt A. S. Kahn also killed, and the radio on the tank of the "E" Company CO, Lt. J. R. Hoffman, knocked out, Col. Doan had no way of communicating with the individual tanks except to dismount and confer with their commanders. But this was done in spite of the close range fire falling around. Gradually, the tanks headed eastward down the draw.

As they proceeded, however, they were subjected to new and heavy fire - long range 88-mm and heavier guns from the town of OBER FORSTBACH and AT guns from the right, from the direction of NUTHEIM. The tanks fought back, but their ammunition was running low. Lt Hoffman's tank was knocked out by an enemy AT gun and the lieutenant slightly wounded.

Between 1700 and 1800, as Col Doan halted in the vicinity of pillbox #4 (see overlay) to reorganize, the situation of the tanks had become very precarious. At 1715 he had radioed General Hickey that he had lost 3 more tanks (Medium), that he had only 10 left, and that he would have to have more "stuff" to get through. He now was ordered to return to confer. He dismounted and walked to the rear.

General Hickey told him that a battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment on his left rear had been ordered to attack (at 1830) and swing around to the left and take NUTHEIM from the West. If given two more platoons of tanks, could he continue his attack on the same objective. Col Doan said he could. The new tank support was ordered up.

The Colonel then went over to the house, formerly the CP, where the forward artillery observer was and told him to get in a tank and go to meet the 26th Infantry Regiment on the other side of the dragons' teeth, in order to establish contact between the two forces.

At dusk, about 1900, the first platoon of supporting tanks - from TF"Y" - joined the decimated force beyond the dragons' teeth, and the other platoon followed. About one hour later, under cover of darkness, the reorganized tanks and the Armored Infantry proceeded up the draw toward the town.

The force had delayed an hour for our artillery to be brought to bear on enemy forces along the road which crosses the draw at 884358 and leads into the village. Small arms and AT fire (Point #5 on the overlay) had been coming from this direction for some time. Lt. Hoffman had been further wounded and put out of action by a sniper, after he dismounted from his knocked-out tank. Another tank had been hit, apparently from this direction, and tanks burned, lighting up the adjoining countryside, leaving only 8 of the original 20. About 40 enemy infantrymen were seen Eastward along the road behind the hedgerows (885358-888360), and Col Doan did not want to run the risk of further losses from bazooka fire in the dark or from AT guns.

The precautions were well taken, for the column reached its objective without serious difficulty. Since the tanks of the original TF"X" force were low on ammunition, the first platoon of the supporting force led the tanks followed by the armored infantry, and finally the other supporting



platoon, which later moved around to protect the right flank. Between 2200 and 2300 the force pulled up at 889363, just outside West of NUTHEIM, at first mistaking the apple orchard at that point for a woods, the night being very dark and overcast. However, the orchard was found to be free of the enemy, so there TF"X" leaguered for the night, posting one company of armored infantry along the road to the East, while posts were also set up on the North, and rest grouped at the Southwest ends of the orchard.

Before leaving the dragons' teeth area two hours earlier, Division had reported the battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment already in NUTHEIM, but this was apparently incorrect, because Col Doan did not make contact until around 2300 after he had begun posting for the night. At this time, however, contact was made by elements of the two forces; Col Doan stumbled by chance into Major Adams, CO of the Infantry Battalion, in the dark and was relieved to learn that the latter was already prepared to set up defenses to the West, thus protecting the left flank of the armored force. It was also determined that the battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment would proceed with the mission of mopping up the area the next day, thus allowing the armored task force more freedom to move out to the EILENDORF area where it was ordered in the morning.

In the morning of 14 September 1944, Task Force Doan (TF"X") was ordered to go north about 4 miles to the vicinity of EILENDORF (K-8943) which lies approximately midway between the city of AACHEN to the west and the factory town of STOLBERG to the east. The task force left NUTHEIM about noon and except for a short skirmish at BRAND there was no considerable fighting during the day. At approximately 1930 in the evening, TF"X" reached the southern outskirts of the village of EILENDORF, where it met some AT fire as it leaguered for the night, setting up the CP at K-893423. Patrols found indications of German infantry ahead.

Patrols were sent out during the night to get information on the roads. At daylight, 15 September 1944, a platoon of the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment patrolled to the West of EILENDORF to feel out the enemy, while other patrols went toward the railroad tracks north of the town. A platoon of light tanks under Capt Maxwell inspected 10 pillboxes in the area (marked in red on the overlay) south of EILENDORF, finding them unmanned, and then swung around northeast to K-880440 to support the infantry platoon which had gone in that direction and contacted the enemy. German infantry was found dug in along the north side of the railroad tracks (K-873447 - 883442). The tank platoon remained with the infantry platoon throughout the day, engaging in small fire fights with the enemy. During the day friendly infantry of the 16th Infantry Regiment was contacted on the left.

At 1130 an outpost from Col Doan's command, sent into the town of EILENDORF, found civilians looting the stores. The Colonel said he saw women grab merchandise, such as underwear, put it on over their other clothing, grab coats, stuff their pockets, and leave the stores.

At about noon, General Hickey arrived and told Col Doan that Task Force "Z" was at BLANDER, coming up on Doan's right. He was changing the original plan for Col Doan to go directly north; he wanted him to push elements to the right. Doan told the General that earlier in the day a platoon of the 1st Battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment had been contacted in the southern part of EILENDORF, and at his suggestion had already taken a route to the right. Now the Colonel sent a platoon of tanks to support the platoon of the 16th.



Not long after noon, both groups were against the dragons' teeth, about two kilometers east to southeast of EILENDORF at a locality called ENGLAND (K-905427). (This second line of dragons' teeth, roughly 4 miles northeast of the other line and approximately parallel to it, extends for a distance of several kilometers in a northwest-southeast direction across the relatively low ground on the southern approaches to STOLBERG). Here the infantry of the 18th Infantry Regiment was pinned down by heavy enemy machinegun fire from pillboxes on the other side of the Dragons' teeth. Doan sent 3 more tanks to assist, and under the cover of their fire the infantry withdrew slightly, leaving the tanks in somewhat exposed position, some of them being on the road at the ENGLAND locality. The tanks found, however, that there was an opening in the dragons' teeth barred only by a few old farm wagons. These the tanks pushed aside and went through. At this point, 1315, General Hickey accompanied by General Rose, Commander of the 3rd Armored Division, came up to the edge of the woods just to the southeast, and saw the tanks going through. Immediately they contacted Col Doan at his CP and ordered the entire Task Force through to the East.

The advance guard meanwhile went northeast beyond the dragons' teeth about 300 yards to a road junction at AM GEISBERG (K-909429) (marked #1 on the overlay), where it was held up by enemy fire coming from the direction of the WURSELER WALD, across the road to the front, either from tanks or self-propelled guns. The fire was also falling on the elements further back, where 8 of our tanks and a platoon of armored infantry of the 36th had now gotten through the gap. Two of our tanks were knocked out just inside the dragons' teeth but did not burn, and two more ahead of them to the left by AT fire from the pillbox marked #2 on the overlay. Elements of the infantry, which had come through the dragons' teeth, reported 3 enemy tanks and AT fire up the road northeast toward STOLBERG, and fire from this direction put two more tanks out of action coming through the dragons' teeth - a total of 6 tanks lost. More support was urgently needed.

At approximately 1600, Col Doan returned to consult with General Hickey. The attack was to be pressed forward without interruption. The Task Force's Armored Infantry, the 1st Battalion of the 36th Infantry Regiment under Lt Col Orr, was ordered forward to clean out the resistance with the mission of reaching SCHNEIDMÜHLE - about one mile to the northeast in the STOLBERG factory area - where it was to contact the 18th Infantry Regiment. The Infantry Regiment would be east of ATSCH, and north of WURSELER WALD, the woods from which TF "X" was now drawing such troublesome fire.

More tanks had now penetrated the dragons' teeth. Three tanks advanced with the forward elements of the armored infantry and 2 more to the rear. Keeping the assault guns and mortars behind the dragons' teeth to cover the advance, the armored infantry cleaned out the road junction at AM GEISBERG and moved up the road to the northeast, "B" Company on the left of the road and "A" Company on the right. The enemy AT guns had withdrawn, so the advance proceeded a mile without resistance - until it reached the road junction near HAMM (marked on overlay), where it met small arms and direct anti-tank fire which came from the woods of the WURSELER WALD on the left, and from the factory area on the right.

It was now past 1800 with darkness approaching. The major part of the task force was still a mile or more to the rear on the other side of the dragons' teeth, so Col Doan ordered the forward elements to "button up" for the night. Col Orr began to consolidate his existing position, setting up a horse shoe-shaped defense across the road, facing the enemy (indicated on Orr overlay). He fanned out his lead company on either side of the road



brought two tanks up the hill, and placed two more in the WURSELER WALD to the rear of his CP. Company "C", in the reserve, was split, men being put on both flanks to give the salient all-around protection. Patrols were sent out to attempt to contact the 16th Infantry Regiment, but reports came back that this force had not yet advanced into the WURSELER WALD, where, however, German infantry was found to be dug in.

In reaching the indicated defense positions, the forward elements of TF "X" had overrun a very cleverly built and camouflaged enemy pillbox (marked #4 on Orr overlay). Designed to resemble an ice house, the camouflage arrangement of the pillbox was complete in every detail, having an ice slide and an artificial ice pond nearby. Markings on the AT gun emplacement in the ice house pillbox dated 1939 and the track was new, but there was no gun.

Patrol activity seemed to indicate that the enemy strength in the WURSELER WALD to the left and front did not consist of more than a company of infantry. Late in the afternoon, however, more strength was indicated, and the enemy knocked out two of the tanks that had moved up with the infantry advance party. One of the tanks only had its track damaged, and could continue to fight to some extent. Although a large part of the Task Force remained south of the dragons' teeth for the night, during the evening assault guns, mortars and some tank destroyers were moved forward as well as the supporting guns (75mm on light tanks, MGs) of two battalions, while a 57mm AT gun was put on the left flank in the WURSELER WALD at the road junction (indicated #3 on the Orr overlay).

At 2000, Col Orr began his night patrolling, one patrol going to the right (northeast) toward HAMM, another to the left with the mission of reaching the high ground west of SCHNEIDMUEHLE. A combat patrol was sent north to penetrate the woods of the WURSELER WALD and to contact the 16th Infantry Regiment if it had been moved up. One platoon of the 83rd Reconnaissance Battalion was made available at 2100 with the mission of patrolling between the elements of the 16th on the right at BUSCHMUEHLE, and the Battalion of the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment.

During the day of 16 September 1944, the battalion was held to the positions taken the night before. Every time an advance was attempted the anti-tank and small arms fire would hold it up. In addition, Col Orr hesitated to move out when the 16th Infantry Regiment on his right had not advanced to protect his flank.

At 1600, he was ordered to move his force out to take the hill at SCHNEIDMUEHLE. A company supported by two tanks moved about 100 yards forwards, when the fire became so intense that the men were pinned down. Thereupon, at 1830 Orr directed them to return in order to present an all-round defense for the night.

During the evening, a prisoner of war said that men were moving into the woods to the North. He stated that many of the Germans had been in the army only a few weeks and that they were being thrown into the fight from many units, with little or no formal organization.

On 17 September 1944 at 0515, the enemy began to fire on the battalion with small arms from the direction of the road junction #2 (see Orr overlay), and the intensity of the fire increased until 0530, when it became clear that a counterattack was developing. Thereupon, Col Orr called for defensive fire from the Division Artillery, which had previously been set up in case of a counterattack. Three concentrations were brought down upon the woods. The lines between "B" Company on the left and the enemy in the



woods were little more than 50 yards apart. The enemy attempted to drive a wedge between "B" Company and "C" Company, penetrating to within 50 yards of the CP, and Orr swung a section of tanks around to the gap about 0545 to stop the advance.

The enemy in this attack came in close waves and even the more hardened of Orr's machine gunners became literally sick at the way they had to mow the line of men down. By 0600, the attack was over. When the patrols pushed again into the woods, they reported that tree bursts from our artillery concentrations had killed a large additional number of the enemy. The patrols further reported, however, that many of the enemy were still moving up on the left towards the road junction marked #3 on the Orr overlay.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment having been ordered the previous night to attack in the direction of HAMM at 0700 - Company A moved as scheduled with a 3rd section of tanks supporting it from a covered position. The company was pinned down by small arms and machine gun fire and both of the medium tanks were hit by fire. A patrol sent from the right flank of the company through the grove of trees toward HAMM met a large number of German infantry digging in about 0900, while sniper fire began to come from the right behind the front lines. The situation "became a little ticklish".

At 1000, with the north flank found to be solid with enemy, a patrol went to the far right and received machine gun fire from a pillbox northwest of the factory area of MUNSTERBUSCH. It was later discovered that these men had reached the pillbox by means of a tunnel from the factory area.

Along the road to SCHNEIDMUEHLE were many more buildings than marked on the map. By observing the ricocheted of tracer bullets, the fake houses could be distinguished which were in reality pillboxes. In the buildings in the edge of MUNSTERBUSCH there were German soldiers firing from houses which carried white flags of surrender.

The right company remained ahead of the rest of the battalion until approximately 1600, when it was brought back and told to take its former position. In the evening Col Orr moved a machine gun and 57mm AT gun to pillbox #4.

In organizing for the night, Col Orr purposely left a gap between "B" and "C" Companies, but moved machine guns to protect it. In the night enemy vehicular traffic moved to the northeast near ATSCH, while tracked vehicles were heard moving in the town of SCHNEIDMUEHLE. About dark, elements of the 16th Infantry Regiment advanced into the WURSELER WALD, and almost as soon as contact was made with them they pulled back leaving the flank of the battalion as exposed as ever. Patrols cut north into the woods and discovered a new line of enemy along the track about two hundred yards north of the former position.

On 18th September the situation remained relatively constant during the day. The battalion was able to observe into the towns to the right and front and gave the supporting air force targets on which to drop bombs.

Early in the morning of 19 September 1944, the battalion was pulled out for another mission, and the sector was given over to elements of the 18th Infantry Regiment. The forward position of the battalion was abandoned however, and the lines of the 18th were across the dragons' teeth, but up



to the real CP of the Battalion. At approximately 1200 the battalion began its push towards MUNSTERBUSCH.

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Prepared by 2nd Information and Historical Section, 1st U. S. Army. -

Lt. FRED L. HADSEL

Pfc. RIDGELY C. DORSEY.



HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMORED DIVISION  
Office of the Commanding General

13 November 1944

Officers and Men, Third Armored "Spearhead" Division.

The following sermon delivered by Chaplain Paul H. Maurer on Sunday, November 12, 1944, is considered to be of such beauty and significance to the members of the 3rd Armored "Spearhead" Division that it is reproduced for the benefit of those who were not privileged to hear it.

*Maurice Rose*  
MAURICE ROSE,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

Shelley said that the poets "learn in suffering what they teach in song." Had I the gift of composition I would translate the suffering of the Third Armored Division and put it to music. The world would possess a symphonic masterpiece indeed. That contribution would serve as an eternal inspiration to posterity. In that "Spearhead" Symphony I would capture and put on paper the cadent pianissimo of the Louisiana birth of history's greatest armored unit. In swaddling clothes of thin-skinned and untried armor this youngster reaped through the Southland's spongy swamps, grew into adolescence with the hot music of the desert on its lips, saw the purple twilight melt into the star-studded night and in moon-drenched sand dreamt of manhood. The clickety clack of wheels on twin bands of steel carried this robust young giant to Camp Pickett, thence to Indiantown Gap, on to Camp Kilmer, New York's sky line and the Atlantic.

Fear of the unknown and mysterious deep failed to still the song within his iron clad heart--a song in which one caught the echoes of Crusader's airs, hymns of Pilgrim and Pioneer, chanting paens of praise as they blazed a path from East to West, a prayer in their hearts, a gun in their hands.

The swish-swash of waves through fair weather and fog brought the Division to England. Comparative peace prevailed. Dance orchestras at Red Lynch, Warminster, Wincanton, Sutton Veru, Fonthill Bishop, were unsuccessful in silencing the martial strains which insistently challenged his every day with reveille and closed it with taps. Salisbury's dismal plains, frosty, star flecked and chilly, ushered in an English spring replete with all the uncomfortable damp and soggy trappings.

Restlessness and a burning desire to engage the foe in mortal combat finds the Third Armored lying on LSTs and LCTs for three days and three nights as the worst storm in twenty years strikes and lashes the channel. The tempo of that gale is as nothing compared to the force with which this unit will sweep through France and Belgium in a few days.



Now to capture the music of high courage as the Third hits the Normandy Beach, then the singing of the birds in the apple orchards of Livados punctuated by guns fired in anger at the enemy beyond St. Lo. Recall that whirring din from out of the blue as three thousand planes unbed their lethal cargoes and the ground boils. Villers-Fossard and the Third patches man's estate! St. Joan de Dayc, Mortain, Purple Heart Hill---prayer beside little crosses and stars of David at La Cambe, Marigny, Gorron-----"I Am The Resurrection And The Life....."Sh'lo Yisroayl....."Requiescant In Pace...", hallowed harmonies of Protestant, Jew and Catholic, joined in the requiem of death from whose graves a living, vibrant and impassioned chorus emanates. (Take up that refrain and with reverent hands touch your instruments and play that refrain again and again).

But we must be away into the struggle at Rames, Fromental, Folaise-Argentan, Corbeil and the Seine, on and on this mighty symphony of heroism rises and swells as it sweeps relentlessly forward. Tanks at Chateau Thierry, sacred soil, tanks at the Marne, tanks at Soissons, tanks, tanks blasting enemy armor into a blackened and charred debacle at Mons, tanks at Charleroi, tanks at Namur, tanks at Liege and reaching a crescendo chord of triumph as they lunge with mighty thrust against and through and over and beyond the steel and iron of the Siegfried Line after a wild, swift, cyclonic drive unparalleled in military history. No, I have not forgotten the sound of those droplets of blood, drip, drip, drip, from a mangled stump of an arm or that brave smile, I haven't forgotten the long lines of singing wires of the Signal men, Engineers bridging stream after stream in total darkness: the sound of motors in the night, long supply columns: the pyrotechnics of the Ack Ack; the chatter of typewriters in the hands of clerks, destined to play their part in this vast score; the crunching bull-dozer chewing hedgerows: Artillerists feeding the hungry maw of the big guns; Air men in their tiny craft; the skilled hands of our Medics; the muddy, slugging guts of our Doughboys; the hurried heart beats of men in fox-holes-tortuous, numbed hours-the stench of death, decay, desolation and destruction: the pensive stare of a young child with a wounded doll in her arms: the clippety clop of wooden shoes; I haven't forgotten the clanging discords, the utterly demonical glee of the SS, Pride of Prussian Panzerdom, their whipped arrogance in our PW cages, where Herren Volk melodies were forever stilled in defeat.

Through it all we hear the over tones of a grim loneliness, heart breaking agony, bleeding experience, indomitable courage, an unrelenting, uncompromising, unswerving devotion to the Spearhead Division and the fortitude of trusting-faith in our officers-----General Rose, conducting this mighty symphony, a baton, not red with blood, but a baton crowned with an eagle and pointing to the stars.

And after this tumultuous surge of war's music, the closing bars would bring the soft, clear, ringing chime of a church bell, calling the Third to worship in the holy hush of a sanctuary, far removed from the sounds of warfare. Then the comfort and peace of hearth and home, a maiden's prayer, a father's hand clasp, the devotion of a loyal wife, a mother's tender lullaby and a babe wrapped in sleep---home is the tanker from the wars.



*1st Bn Hq*  
*Hq Co A*  
*W.H.J.*  
*Dr*  
*10/15*  
*MS*

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMORED DIVISION  
Office of the Commanding General

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
31 December 1944

Subject: Letters of Commendation.

To : Combat, Regimental and Separate Unit Commanders.

It is with much pleasure that the accompanying letters of commendation on the work of this Division are published for the information of all the members of the Division. The letters herewith reproduced will be read to all members of the Division within 12 hours after the receipt of this communication.

By command of Major General ROSE:



ROBERT M. GANT,  
Lt Col, AGD,  
Adjutant General.

3 Incls - Letters of Commendation

Incl #1 - Ltr CG, 1st US Inf Div, 10 Dec 44

Incl #2 - Ltr CG, VII Corps, 16 Dec 44

Incl #3 - Ltr CG, XVIII Corps (Airborne) 31 Dec 44

DISTRIBUTION: "A"



mss

HEADQUARTERS 1ST US INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO #1, U. S. Army

10 December 1944

SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation.

TO : Commanding General, 3d U.S. Armored Division, APO 253, U.S. Army.

1. In the recent operation just completed, commencing with the attack and capture of Gressenich and Hamich and culminating in the capture of Langerwehe, Luchem, and Jungersdorf, the 3d U.S. Armored Division rendered the highest degree of assistance to this Division.

2. The frequent, timely and effective firing of the 3d U.S. Armored Division Artillery, the speedy capture of Werth and Hastenrath and the coordinated attack and capture of Hucheln and Frenzerburg in conjunction with the 47th Infantry, were of inestimable value in our mutual success during the operation. The spirit of cooperation displayed by your units made the necessary coordination and teamwork possible. The complete understanding shown by your officers and men of the problems involved in the operation welded our units together into a powerful striking force.

3. I wish to express my appreciation to you and the personnel of your Division for the great assistance rendered in making the operation successful, and for the admirable spirit and ability shown by your units.

/s/ C. R. Huebner  
/t/ C. R. HUEBNER  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

1st Ind.

As

(10 December 44)

HEADQUARTERS VII CORPS, APO 307, United States Army,

TO: Commanding General, 3d Armored Division, APO 253, United States Army.

It is a pleasure to forward this generous tribute to the "Spearhead" Division. The actions described formed a major contribution to the successful reduction of key terrain east of the Inde River and added another brilliant chapter to the fighting record of the 3d Armored Division.

/s/ J. Lawton Collins  
/t/ J. LAWTON COLLINS,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

Reproduced Hq 3d Armd Div, APO #253, US Army



MSB

HEADQUARTERS VII CORPS  
Office of the Commanding General

16 December 1944

In Reply Refer To:

Major General Maurice Rose  
Commanding, 3d Armored Division  
APO #253, United States Army

Dear General Rose:

The clearing of enemy from the VII Corps zone west of the Roer River marks the end of another phase of our operations, and affords me an opportunity to express to you and the officers and men of the 3d Armored Division my profound appreciation for the magnificent work done by the division since it joined the VII Corps on July 15, 1944.

Following the aerial bombardment of July 25, 1944, the 3d Armored Division played a major part in the decisive breakthrough of the German positions northwest of St. Lo which changed the slow and costly "hedgerow" fighting of Normandy into a rapid war of maneuver. Combat Command Boudinot, attached to the 1st Infantry Division, led the attack from the vicinity of Marigny to cut the enemy's communications at Coutances. Farther to the south, the bulk of the 3d Armored Division, advancing by way of Cerisy la Salle, protected the south flank of the 1st Division and drove the enemy from his positions southeast of Coutances. Turning quickly to the south the division assisted in crushing the German forces caught between itself and the 3d Armored Division in the vicinity of St. Denis le Gast, which resulted in one of the most disastrous defeats the Germans suffered in France.

During the pursuit phase that followed, the 3d Armored Division greatly assisted the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions in their crossing of the Sienne River and in their drive to the south to capture the key communication centers of Villedieu les Poêles, Brecey and Mortain, east of Avranches, thus blocking off the corridor through which the Third Army was fanning into Brittany. An official journal of the German Seventh Army emphasizes the vital character of these operations.

During the critical battle in the vicinity of Mortain in which the German Seventh Army endeavored to cut the communications of the First and Third American Armies in the direction of Avranches, elements of the 3d Armored Division played a decisive part. The single enemy penetration north of Mortain was finally checked by Combat Command Boudinot which then proceeded to assist elements of the 4th and 30th Infantry Divisions in annihilating this German force.

Following the Mortain battle, the 3d Armored Division carried the whip-end of the VII Corps' attack toward Falaise from the south. In vicious fighting at Ranex and Fromental, the division crumbled part of the southern anchor of the Falaise Gap through which the German forces were retreating to the east.



After the VII Corps had been shifted to the east across the Seine River, the 3d Armored Division spearheaded its advance across the Marne and Aisne Rivers, recapturing the historic World War I battle fields of Soissons and Chemin des Dames and was well on the way to Mezieres when the VII Corps was directed to the north to cut off the retreat of the German forces endeavoring to escape through Belgium. The 3d Armored Division wheeled to the left, crossed into Belgium at Maubeuge and quickly seized the important road center of Mons. This was done in the nick of time, for the next day an entire German corps struck the positions of the 3d Armored Division and the 1st Infantry Division on its left. There followed one of the decisive battles of the Western Front in which over 23,000 Germans were taken prisoner and other thousands killed or wounded. This disastrous defeat sealed the fate of Namur and Liege and made possible the rupture of the Siegfried defenses south of Aachen.

Even before the conclusion of the Mons battle, the 3d Armored Division was again spearheading the advance of the VII Corps reversing the route of the 1940 German invasion of Belgium via Charleroi, Namur and Liege. On September 11th elements of the division crossed into Germany and the next day began breaching the Siegfried wall. With great skill and determination the division over-ran the first line of defenses and then crashed through the even more formidable second line in the Munsterbusch - Stolberg area. The rapid breaking of this second line unquestionably saved thousands of American lives which would have been lost in our recent operations if this position had had to be attacked fully manned by the Germans.

In the operations just brought to a close, each of the combat commands of the division was called upon in turn for quick powerful thrusts to secure decisive objectives. These were taken with the cool daring and minimum loss of life which has characterized all of the operations of the division during these past six months.

Please convey to each officer and man of your great fighting organization my personal appreciation and admiration for these great achievements. We look forward with confidence to our coming advance to the Rhine, knowing that leading the way over all opposition will be the 3d Armored--the Spearhead Division.

/s/ J. Lawton Collins  
/t/ J. LAWTON COLLINS,  
Major General, U.S. Army,  
Commanding.

Reproduced Hq, 3d Armd Div, APO #253, US Army



HEADQUARTERS XVIII CORPS (AIRBORNE)  
Office of the Corps Commander

AFO 109 - In the Field  
310930 December 1944

Dear General Rose:

This is to express to you and your magnificent division my appreciation both of its services while in this Corps during the first critical days of this operation, services which maintained in all respects the high reputation the 3d Armored Division has earned and uniformly maintained since the invasion of Normandy, and my recognition of the privilege of sharing this service with so distinguished a commander and the unit he leads.

The best wishes of this Corps go with the 3d Armored Division, as well as the hope that we may again work together for the accomplishment of our joint task.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

/s/ M. B. Ridgway  
/t/ M. B. RIDGWAY,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

Major General M. Rose,  
Commanding,  
3d Armored Division.

Reproduced Hq 3d Armd Div, AFO #253, US Army



HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMORED DIVISION  
Office of the Commanding General


A.F.O. #253,  
U. S. Army,  
14 December 1944.

TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE THIRD ARMORED (SPEARHEAD) DIVISION:

The members of my staff and I extend to each individual of this Division and to their loved ones at home, our sincere good wishes for a Merry Christmas and a very Happy New Year.

The successful operation of this Division from the beaches of Normandy to the banks of the Roer in Germany has been made possible only by your devotion to duty, self sacrifice, and adherence to the high ideals and standards that we have set for ourselves.

Please transmit to your loved ones at home my personal good wishes for the coming holidays, and my sincere hope that next Christmas will find all of us reunited with those we left at home, when the achievements of the Spearhead Division will be the subject of proud conversation rather than a basis for future planning. It will then be with a feeling of satisfaction that we will know that we have done our part to restore "peace on earth and good will to men."



MAURICE ROSE,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

*Dear Mother,*

*This was given to us  
on Christmas day, from  
the Gen. keeps this to  
with the other clippings till I  
get home*

*Love Leonard*



VIT COMES VARIETI D'ITALIA NO. 1471

On 16 December the German counter-offensive began on the front of VIII Corps. This attack started on an approximate 40-45 mile front generally between EPTON, 15 miles northwest of Trier, and MASTADT, just west of MONSIEUR Forest, in which were employed, initially, approximately 13-15 divisions comprising two Panzer and two of the infamous SS Panzer Divisions. This force was gradually increased as his penetrations of our lines became deeper until on 21 December the equivalent of 20-25 enemy divisions had been employed and penetration as far west as SAAR, 15 miles north of EPTON; as far north as ST. LOUIS, 5 miles southwest of MASTADT had been made. In the south, the situation was extremely fluid and fighting taking place in MERVILLE, 5 miles northeast of MASTADT, and in SCHWABACH.

Meanwhile, the Corps, still operating in the Bull's area, continued to clean out small patches of resistance in its zone, keeping a constant eye on the enemy's successes to the south. That it probably would be affected directly, and certainly, indirectly, became more and more apparent from the first day of the major counter drive.

Being a byproduct to the growing light to the south was short lived when on 18 December, the 9th Infantry Division plus a combat command of the 3rd Armored Division were relieved from attachment to the Corps and attached to V Corps. The 8th and 78th Infantry Divisions plus a combat command of 5th Armored Division were attached to the Corps and the boundary changed between the VII and V Corps giving VII Corps a larger zone. On 19 December the remainder of 3rd Armored Division was lost to V Corps. Between 19 and 21 December the Corps' role was virtually defensive. In the meantime the situation in the south became more critical. Obviously changes had to be made and plans to stop the enemy's drive had to be put into effect. Consequently, on the night of December 20 verbal orders were received to move the Corps to the critical area. Even before the change became effective (212400 December) elements of the Headquarters were moving toward the new zone.

When the new area was taken over officially at 1200A on 22 December, the westerly and northwesterly advances of the enemy had not been halted. He was pressing forward to his initial objectives on the I-405 River without let-up, employing many small groups of tanks and infantry which ranged out taking possession of key road junctions, towns and terrain features in preparation for the advance of the main striking force of the 4th, 5th and 6th SS Panzer Armies.

From the beginning of the enemy's drive on 16 December, he had forged ahead to the west with varying degrees of speed. True, he had been held up at ST VIRE by the valiant stand of two regiments of the 106th Infantry Division. True, he could not pierce the defense of BASTOGNE. Nevertheless, he moved west while shooting other columns to the northwest against the stiffened defenses of V Corps, and VIII Corps. His limited successes to the north and northwest were not according to plan, and he paid a most costly price in armor for what few feet he did gain.

Realizing he must not stop at any point, he continued with ever in-  
creasing speed toward the west hoping to reach the HWY 301 driver and turn  
north toward DIAZ. By midnight of 22 December armored columns of 116<sup>th</sup>  
Division and 2<sup>nd</sup> Division had reached points in the new VII Corps zone  
from east to west at GREENHILL (-5290) - BOY (-1189) - LAMAR (-3886)  
South of LAMAR (-2983) - HUNTER (-2361) - DUBOISVILLE (-1862) - LEBANON (-1288)



Infantry Division, as yet untried under fire (75th Inf Div). The Corps set to work establishing boundaries and rushing plans to stabilize an extremely fluid situation. Initially, orders were received moving the Corps to a concentration area in the new zone. Before this could be fully completed the enemy's advance brought him into contact with the 84th Infantry Division and elements of the 3rd Armored Division, necessitating the issuance of orders by higher headquarters to prevent any further enemy movement to the west and northwest. On receipt of these instructions, an attack was ordered in the area where the enemy was making the greatest headway.

The attack of 23 December of the 2nd Armored Division may well be remembered as having one of the most far reaching effects of any action of World War II, for the masterful execution of this attack by the 2nd "Hell on Wheels" Armored Division not only stopped the German 2nd Panzer Division long before he could reach AUN, but annihilated a great part of it and forced the remnants to withdraw from Belles, IGNOX, BUISSONVILLE and HUMAIN toward RECHENFORT, thus bringing to halt the greatest sustained German counter drive against Allied troops on the Continent since D-Day.

The meeting of the US 2nd Armored Division and German 2nd Panzer Division was a fitting comparison of Allied and German armored might. Each was an able representative of the armored division of the Army. For 14 days the engagement continued, involving hundreds of small battles. By 25 December the German onslaught began to falter, stopped, and gradually withdrew, losing heavily in men and material. The following figures will give some idea of the destruction suffered by the 2nd Pz Division during the period between 23 December and 27 December. It is estimated the division strength just before this four-day period was approximately 8000 men and 100 tanks.

Men taken.....	1050
Estimated Killed.....	2000-2500
Tanks Destroyed.....	52
Tanks Captured.....	3
Artillery Pieces Destroyed..	6
Artillery Pieces Captured...	12
Assault Guns Destroyed.....	4
Assault Guns Captured.....	1
Vehicles Destroyed.....	121 (Incl. 30 armd.)
Vehicles Captured.....	69 ( " 10

Elsewhere along the Corps front the enemy punched determinedly throughout the week against coveted points held or controlled by our troops. He could not force the surrender of a 1st or 3rd Armored Division which had driven across his westward zone of advance to hold and eventually be surrounded. By sheer guts this force beat off repeated attacks and after three days destroyed its vehicles and equipment, and made its way through 10 miles of enemy lines. It arrived with approximately 90% of its personnel in friendly lines.

Nowhere was the enemy able to penetrate and exploit the line established by our units at the start of the operations. On the contrary, having lost the initiative taken from him, he sustained the loss of a great part of his 2nd Pz Division, he suffered severe losses in men and equipment inflicted by our armor, our artillery, and our air and his dream of the conquest and destruction of the Allied armies was closed, stopped and thrown back.

During the week the enemy employed all or elements of seven divisions (2nd Pz Division, 9 Pz Division, GROSSKURASSCHER Brigade, 116 Pz Division, 560 Volksgrenadier Division, 2nd SS Division, and 12th SS Division) which include at least four of his most able fighting units. The week has seen the initiative slip from him, and at the close of the period he was definitely on the defensive, after having been forced to withdraw from AUN.



Scrap Book

HEADQUARTER COMPANY SCHEDULE--THURSDAY DEC. 14

TO ALL PLATOONS:

The following schedule will be followed by Hq. & Hq. Co. today, Thursday, Dec. 14.

1.--Weapons will be stripped & cleaned (who knows, you might have mud on it from dodging those "Krautss" heavy stuff).

2.--Clean all vehicles. Mine was so full of junk that I couldn't lay on the floor and of course, the 3 others who heard the shell first were much faster than I.

3.--Police the Quarters.

4.--Men will shower and shave. Lets not look like the "ole man" did yesterday. I know that there are no women handy but I like to see how you look later on in life.

5.--S1 and I & R will queue up for showers first. This "aint" England but we are much closer to Omaha Beach than we were yesterday.

6.--Catholic Mass--9:30.

No Protestant. But I am not worried about religion for I've been praying everyday anyhow.

ANY OTHER COMPLAINTS OR GRIES, COMMONLY KNOWN IN THIS COMPANY AS "BITCHES" CAN SEE THE COMPANY CHAPLAIN.

By Order of the Company Commander

FRANK D. Hall

P. S. Chaplain elect today is the 1st. Sgt.